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Abstract 
The impact of population structure on economic growth has been studied in recent 
decades using different methods to estimate the so-called demographic dividend. 
Besides, education has been pointed out as a key factor in economic growth. We 
propose a decomposition of the demographic dividend, into age and education 
effects. We illustrate the potential of the method by illustrating its application to 
Mexico and Spain over the period 1970-2100. To that end, we estimate the 
National Transfer Accounts age profiles by schooling level and apply them to 
recently available population projections stratified by educational level. Our results 
confirm the role of population age structure in the demographic dividend, but also 
reveal that education attainment can be even more crucial. Moreover, we find that 
the way how both age and education effects finally impact on economic growth 
depends to a great extent on the specific consumption and labor income age 
profiles in each country. 
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1 Introduction 
The effect of the population age structure on economic growth has been 
extensively studied over the last two decades, mainly motivated by the 
demographic transition from high to low mortality and fertility rates that most 
countries are experiencing as they develop. Previous research was focused on the 
link between population size and growth, but the influential work of Bloom & 
Williamson (1998) explicitly introduced age structure into the analysis, finding that 
this was an important mechanism by which demographic variables affect economic 
growth. The concept of demographic gift, later re-named as demographic 
dividend, first appeared in Bloom & Williamson’s work to refer to the positive effect 
that the demographic transition can have on economic growth. During this 
process, there is a temporary stage where the working-age population grows 
faster than the total population; that is, the support ratio –the share of working-
age population in total population– grows. Consequently, per capita income can 
increase as there are fewer economic dependents in the population. Nevertheless, 
this effect will vanish some years later, when baby boomers reach retirement age, 
leading to an increase in old dependency ratios, i.e. population aging.  
The demographic transition has coincided in time with a significant educational 
expansion that occurred in virtually every country in the world during the 20th 
century, especially after the 1960s. Certainly, important differences remain 
between areas, but all of them show general improvements in education 
(UNESCO, 2011). This means that the empirically observed effects of population 
age structure on economic growth are probably influenced by improvements in 
the education level of the population. Since the late 1960s, a vast branch of 
economic research has been studying the return to education, on the level of both 
micro-effects of education on individual earnings and macro-effects on economic 
growth (Johnes & Johnes, 2004). The micro based literature in labour economics, 
based on the Mincerian human capital earnings function (Mincer, 1974), produced 
estimations of the rates of return to schooling. From a macro-economic 
perspective, several cross-country studies have investigated the effects of 
educational attainment on the GDP growth rate.  However, as Psacharopoulos & 
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Patrinos (2004) point out, the weakest point of the macroeconomic growth models 
is the requirement of substantial data, due to the difficulties in constructing 
comparable inter-temporal and inter-country human capital data, including 
comparability problems of National Accounts figures. As a result, the empirical 
evidence about the positive effect of education on earnings observed at the micro 
level cannot always be corroborated at the macro level. Nevertheless, micro level 
results are clear and solid enough to justify the profitability of investment in 
education. As Stevens & Weale (2004) state, if people with more education earn 
more the same should occur for a group of individuals, and particularly for a 
country.  
Summarizing, two strands of literature analysing the determinants of economic 
growth have evolved separately during recent decades. On the one hand, there is 
the research about the demographic dividend, trying to elucidate the effects of 
the population age structure on economic growth, but without paying specific 
attention to changes in educational level. On the other hand, a longstanding 
branch of economic research has been devoted to disentangling the relationship 
between economic growth and the educational attainment of the population, but 
without special regard to the population age composition. The work from Lutz et 
al. (2008) and the recent paper by Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2014) act as a kind 
of meeting point between the two previous research lines, as they try to 
disentangle the role of age structure and education in economic growth by using 
panel data. As they point out, research on the demographic dividend was initially 
linked to education (Bloom & Williamson, 1998). But only in the studies from Lee 
& Mason (Lee et al., 2000; Lee & Mason, 2010; Mason et al., 2016)  changes in 
the age structures are linked to increases in the investment on human capital of 
children showing an impact on economic growth, although not considering 
changes in the level of education of the population. In Crespo-Cuaresma et al. 
(2014), they estimate a macroeconomic growth model using a newly available 
dataset on human capital, containing information about educational attainment 
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distribution by age and sex for more than 100 countries for the period 1980-20051.  
They conclude that, when correcting for educational expansion, the effect of 
population age structure on GDP per capita is reduced significantly, that is to say 
that the so-called demographic dividend is mainly an education effect. Education 
and age composition of the population are treated as two separate factors in the 
regressions, as if the education level of the population was not related to the age 
structure of the same population. 
In our study, we link education attainment to the evolution of the population age 
structure using a different method. We propose an extension of the methodology 
developed by Mason (2005) and Mason & Lee (2006), in order to decompose the 
growth in the support ratio – the demographic dividend – into two different 
components: age and education. These authors combined demographic 
information with the age profiles of consumption and labour income, estimated 
following the National Transfer Accounts (NTA) method. We follow the same 
strategy, taking it one step further. We first estimate the NTA age profiles by 
education level and then we adapt the method to incorporate education variability. 
Second, in order to illustrate the potential of this methodological extension, we 
perform a simulation exercise for Mexico and Spain, for which we were able to 
construct the NTA profiles by level of education2. Likewise, these two countries 
represent two different contexts in terms of demographic transition and 
educational achievements of their populations, allowing for an interesting 
comparison. Our simulation will recover the history of population back to 1970 
and projecting it into the future until 2100. We are thus able to evaluate the impact 
of population age structure on the support ratio, but taking into account that 
changes in education also influence the production and consumption level.  
                                       
1 The data set was constructed by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
at the Vienna Institute of Demography (IIASA-VID). 
2 The NTA profiles for Mexico are built upon Mejía-Guevara (2015), though estimated at 
individual instead of at household level of education. Recently, NTA profiles by level of 
education have been obtained also for Chile (Miller et al., 2014) and Austria (Hammer, 
2015) and a previous work for Brazil explored socio-economic inequalities in NTA profiles 
(Turra & Queiroz, 2005). 
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, after a brief 
review about the estimation of the demographic dividend, we propose the 
decomposition of the demographic dividend into two different factors, age and 
education effects. The third section is devoted to describing and constructing the 
data needed for the estimation – including population projections by level of 
education and the age profiles of consumption and labour income by education 
level for Mexico and Spain. The fourth section shows the main results of different 
simulation exercises, estimating the proposed decomposition of the demographic 
dividend. Finally, conclusions are in the last section. 
2 Decomposing the demographic dividend by age and 
education level 
Based on Mason (2005), the concept of the demographic dividend can be formally 
derived starting from the following decomposition of per capita income at year t: 
   
𝑌(𝑡)
𝑁(𝑡)
=
𝑊(𝑡)
𝑁(𝑡)
·
𝑌(𝑡)
𝑊(𝑡)
                                                                     (1) 
 
With Y being income, N total population and W working-age population 
(hereinafter workers). The first term on the right-hand side, the ratio of workers 
to total population, represents the support ratio (SR). The second term on the 
right-hand side is income per worker (productivity, l). Hence, income per capita 
depends on these two factors: the support ratio (SR) and productivity (l). 
Expressing Eq (1) as growth rates (g), it can be derived that SR changes and 
productivity growth rates determine per capita income growth: 
𝑔 ( 
𝑌(𝑡)
𝑁(𝑡)
) = 𝑔(𝑆𝑅) +  𝑔(𝑙)                                                                  (2) 
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The demographic dividend is captured by the evolution of the support ratio. Bloom 
& Williamson (1998) were among the first authors to estimate it. Using regression 
analysis, they concluded that the demographic transition contributed to the so-
called economic miracle observed in East Asia over the period 1965-1990. Kelley 
& Schmidt (2001) and Bloom & Canning (2003) also carried out other empirical 
studies using cross-country aggregate data. Mason (2005) and Mason & Lee 
(2006) derive an alternative estimation process for the evolution of the support 
ratio, combining demographic and economic information. By using the per capita 
age profiles of labour income and consumption, they obtain the number of 
effective consumers (C) and producers (L) instead of N and W in Eq (1). With ci 
and lyi  being the per capita age profiles of consumption and labour income, 
respectively, C and L can be obtained as follows: 
𝐶(𝑡) =∑𝑁𝑖(𝑡) · 𝑐𝑖
𝑖
                                                                    (3) 
𝐿(𝑡) =∑𝑁𝑖(𝑡) · 𝑙𝑦𝑖
𝑖
                                                                  (4) 
 
In this way, the pure demographic support ratio in Eq. (2) is redefined as an 
economic support ratio that we will be referring to as support ratio (SR), as it 
considers not only demographic effects of population age structure, but also 
economic variables, such as labour and consumption patterns. Estimations of the 
demographic dividend based on the SR are available for many countries (Mason, 
2005; Mason & Lee, 2006; Oosthuizen, 2015; Patxot et al., 2011; Prskawetz & 
Sambt, 2014). Results show that, for most developed countries, the demographic 
dividend started in around the 1970s and lasted for about three decades, but some 
differences can be observed depending on the specific demographic and economic 
characteristics of each country. 
In order to consider the effect of education explicitly in the estimation of the 
demographic dividend, we further break down Eqs (3) and (4) by educational 
group, represented by j: 
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𝐶(𝑡) =∑𝐶𝑗(𝑡) =
𝑗
    ∑∑𝑁𝑖𝑗(𝑡)
𝑗𝑖
· 𝑐𝑖𝑗                                    (5) 
𝐿(𝑡) =∑𝐿𝑗(𝑡) =
𝑗
    ∑∑𝑁𝑖𝑗(𝑡)
𝑗𝑖
· 𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑗                                    (6) 
 
Once the economic profiles have been differentiated by both age and education, 
it is possible to measure the contribution of each of these two factors to the 
demographic dividend, estimated as the growth of SR. First, we apply the method 
of Das Gupta (1993) in order to decompose the annual growth of effective 
producers (L) into a rate-effect (R), an age-effect (A) and an education-effect (E), 
as3: 
𝐿(𝑡 + 𝑥) −  𝐿(𝑡) = [?̅?(𝑡 + 𝑥) − ?̅?(𝑡)]⏟          
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒−𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
+ [?̅?(𝑡 + 𝑥) − ?̅?(𝑡)]⏟          
𝑎𝑔𝑒−𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
+ [?̅?(𝑡 + 𝑥) − ?̅?(𝑡)]⏟          
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛−𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
    (7) 
 
?̅?(𝑡) in Eq [7] refers to the age and education standardized rate-effect in year t 
(and t+x) and is measured as: 
?̅?(𝑡) = ∑
𝑁𝑖𝑗
𝑁
(𝑡+𝑥)+
𝑁𝑖𝑗
𝑁
(𝑡)
2
𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑖,𝑗 (𝑡)    (8) 
 
Where Nij/N represents the share of people of age i and education level j relative 
to the total population, and lyij is the labour income profile by age and educational 
level.  
Likewise, ?̅?(𝑡) corresponds to a rate and education standardization of the age-
effect: 
                                       
3 See Das Gupta (1993) chapter 5 pp. 55-96. 
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?̅?(𝑡) = ∑
𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑗(𝑡+𝑥)+𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑗(𝑡)
2
∙
𝑒𝑖𝑗(𝑡+𝑥)+𝑒𝑖𝑗(𝑡)
2
∙ 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑖,𝑗 (𝑡)   (9) 
 
With aij and eij being the age and education effects, respectively. They can be 
isolated from the age and education level structure of the population in year t as: 
𝑁𝑖𝑗(𝑡)
𝑁(𝑡)
= (
𝑁𝑖𝑗(𝑡)
𝑁.𝑗(𝑡)
∙
𝑁𝑖.(𝑡)
𝑁(𝑡)
)
1
2
⏟        
𝑎𝑖𝑗(𝑡)
∙ (
𝑁𝑖𝑗(𝑡)
𝑁𝑖.(𝑡)
∙
𝑁.𝑗(𝑡)
𝑁(𝑡)
)
1
2
⏟        
𝑒𝑖𝑗(𝑡)
               (10) 
 
The last term in Eq [7], E(t), is estimated as the rate and age standardization of 
the education effect: 
?̅?(𝑡) = ∑
𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑗(𝑡+𝑥)+𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑗(𝑡)
2
∙
𝑎𝑖𝑗(𝑡+𝑥)+𝑎𝑖𝑗(𝑡)
2
∙ 𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑖,𝑗 (𝑡)   (11) 
 
Secondly, consumption is decomposed in the same way as labour income, into 
rate, education and age effects. 
Finally, the decomposition of labour income and consumption obtained in the three 
effects mentioned is introduced into the estimation of the SR growth rate as: 
𝑔(𝑆𝑅) = 𝑔(𝐿) − 𝑔(𝐶) =  
𝐿(𝑡+𝑥)− 𝐿(𝑡)
𝐿(𝑡)
− 
𝐶(𝑡+𝑥)− 𝐶(𝑡)
𝐶(𝑡)
= 
?̇?𝐿+?̇?𝐿+?̇?𝐿
𝐿(𝑡)
−  
?̇?𝐶+?̇?𝐶+?̇?𝐶
𝐶(𝑡)
   (12) 
 
To carry on the decomposition explained here, we need age profiles of 
consumption and labour income by education level to apply them to the population 
over several years. Population data, therefore, also need to be disaggregated by 
age and education level. We perform the decomposition for Mexico and Spain from 
1970 to 2100, taking one base year for the economic profiles. This implies that 
the rate effect described above (Eq. 8) will not be captured. 
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3 Data requirements 
3.1 Population data by level of education 
We used population projections by level of education, available from the 
Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital.4 The Wittgenstein 
Center has produced, for the first time, projections of population by educational 
level, age and sex for 195 countries for the period 1970-2100, using exhaustive 
information and analyses of recent trends on fertility, mortality, migration, and 
educational attainment for the different areas of the world (Lutz et al., 2014). 
They also consider other scenarios in their projections. We will use two of them 
for the sensitivity analysis. On the one hand, the CER (Constant Enrolment Rate) 
scenario considers that enrolment rates remain constant over time from 2015 
onwards, in both countries; therefore, no significant improvements in education 
level are expected beyond the coming decades. On the other hand, the FT (Fast 
Track) scenario assumes that enrolment rates improve faster than in the central 
projection. 
In order to observe the evolution of the age structure in both countries, Figure 1 
shows the dependency ratios (using data only by age and year) obtained from 
Lutz et al. (2014) data for 1970-2100. First, child dependency has experienced a 
clear decline in both countries but with different patterns. For Mexico, the 
demographic transition started later than in Spain, but it has been much more 
pronounced as the initial level of fertility was higher. At the beginning of the 
century child dependency was still over 50%, but it will continue to decrease until 
2050, when it will stabilize at around 25%. In the case of Spain, child dependency 
reached its minimum (slightly above 20%) in the early 2000s and is expected to 
remain at around that level until 2040. After that year, it will increase to 25% and 
will remain at around that level for the rest of the century. 
                                       
4 We used the newest version of the data from Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and 
Global Human Capital, including both past data and future projections of population 
distribution by educational level from 1970 to 2100 (Lutz et al., 2014; Speringer et al., 
2015). 
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Figure 1: Population dependency ratios in Mexico and Spain 1970 – 2100 
 
Second, demographic patterns are also different regarding old dependency. In 
Mexico, it will increase especially after 2030 and will continue to grow over the 
rest of the century. In the case of Spain, it starts to grow earlier and will peak at 
69% by 2050, a level that Mexico will never reach during the period. The whole 
process is strongly driven by the evolution of the fertility rate, which was 2.15 in 
Mexico in 2015 (CONAPO, 2015), while it was only 1.3 in Spain in 2013 (INE, 
2015). Projections for Mexico predict that the fertility rate will remain higher than 
in Spain, and consequently the increase in its old dependency ratio will be slower 
(UN, 2015). Finally, it is worth noting that during the first part of the period 
analysed – until 2010 in Spain and 2030 in Mexico - the total dependency ratio 
was mainly driven by the evolution of child dependency. Conversely, old 
dependency will become the main driver of total dependency in the future. Note 
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also that the minimum level of the total dependency expected in Mexico (48% in 
2030) is slightly higher than in Spain (44% in 2005-2009). 
Figure 2 displays population projections by level of education (percentage of adult 
population in each education level) for the baseline scenario (the medium case), 
as well as the alternative scenarios for the period 1970-2090. 
We observed that Mexico and Spain have experienced great improvements in their 
level of education in recent decades, reducing the share of adults with less than 
primary education and increasing the amount of people with higher education 
levels. Nevertheless, important differences exist between both countries. 
According to the OECD (2013), in 2011 Mexico was clearly behind the OECD 
average in terms of people aged 25-34 who had completed at least upper 
secondary education (55% compared to 82% in OECD) and who had attainted 
tertiary education (23% compared to 39% in OECD). Those figures were 
significantly better in the case of Spain (65% of people aged 25-34 with upper 
secondary education and 39% with tertiary education). According to Lutz et al. 
(2014) projections, the differences will remain in the future. For example, in Spain 
adults with less than primary school practically vanish in 2035 (they will be below 
3% of total population), but this will only occur 20 years later in Mexico. Regarding 
post-secondary education, by 2100 53% of Spaniards but only 41% of Mexicans 
will have post-secondary education.  
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Figure 2: Distribution of the population by education level in Mexico (MX) and Spain (ES) 1970 – 
2100, for different projection scenarios 
When observing both alternative scenarios, significant differences between 
educational attainment in Mexico and Spain remain. However, we can observe 
that the CER scenario stops improving education attainment of the population 
after 2050 in both countries. In the FT scenario, post-secondary education 
proportions increase faster, and not only proportions of people with less than 
primary but also with primary education are reduced to very low levels. 
Nevertheless, by 2090, Spain continues to have a higher proportion of population 
with post-secondary education than Mexico. 
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3.2 Constructing age profiles of consumption and labor 
income by level of education 
We briefly describe the procedure to construct economic profiles by age and 
educational level for Mexico and Spain. We are basically interested in two profiles: 
labour income and consumption. The labour income profile will be used to obtain 
the number of effective producers (Eq 3), and the consumption profile to estimate 
the number of effective consumers (Eq 4). The difference between labour income 
and consumption age profiles defines the so-called lifecycle deficit (LCD) in the 
National Transfer Accounts (NTA) methodology. The LCD shows how production 
and consumption vary over the lifecycle. Typically, individuals consume more than 
they produce during two periods – at the beginning and at the end of their lives - 
and the opposite occurs for working-age individuals. The length of these three 
periods, together with the amount of the corresponding deficit (when consumption 
exceeds labour income) or surplus (when consumption falls short of labour 
income) varies among countries (Lee & Mason, 2011).  
We followed the NTA methodology (UN, 2013) to construct economic profiles that 
are estimated through surveys and official data, and then adjusted to aggregate 
data from National Accounts. The labour income profile is comprised of the sum 
of earnings and self-employment income profiles among the total population by 
age and education level, and the consumption profile includes a profile of both 
public and private consumption. We go beyond the standard NTA methodology by 
differentiating age profiles by education level.  We consider four levels of education 
–1) Less than primary; 2) Primary completed; 3) Secondary completed; 4) Higher 
education – similar to Mejía-Guevara (2015), but using individual education 
instead of the education level of the household head.5 
                                       
5 This difference is made to allow the application of the economic profiles to population 
projections by age and education. We assign the average level of household consumption 
to those individuals under age 25, given that a great proportion of them have not finished 
their studies. Therefore, there is no difference in consumption by education level for the 
population under 25 years-old. 
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Data for Mexico are from the year 2004. Micro data on labour and private 
consumption are extracted from the Income and Expenditure Survey (ENIGH), 
while public consumption data come from administrative records (SHCP, 2004).  
In the case of Spain, data are for 2006 and come from different sources. Private 
consumption data come from the Household Budget Survey (EPF), labour income 
data are extracted from the EU-SILC (EURSOTAT, 2007) and public consumption 
data come from different public administration statistics (INE, IGAE). Specific 
details on the construction process of profiles for each country are described 
elsewhere (Mejía-Guevara, 2011 & Mejia-Guevara & Bush, 2014 for Mexico; Patxot 
et al., 2011a, 2011b for Spain). 
Figures 3 and 4 show the per capita age profiles of labour income and consumption 
by level of education from Mexico and Spain, respectively. To make them 
comparable, they have been divided by the average labour income for ages 30 to 
49 in the same country. Although with differences, both average economic profiles 
(black lines in the Figures) present the typical shape by age: while consumption 
remains quite stable over the lifecycle for adults, labour income is clearly 
concentrated in the middle years of working age (Lee & Ogawa, 2011; Tung, 
2011). Nevertheless, the differentiation of those profiles by educational 
attainment brings significant new features. First, in both countries labour income 
profiles present higher differences than consumption profiles; that is, labour 
income is more unequal according to level of education than consumption. In 
Spain, the labour income profile peaks at around ages 50-54 for higher education 
levels (post-secondary and secondary education), while it peaks at younger ages 
for lower levels of education. The per capita labour income at age 50-54 for people 
with post-secondary education level represents more than double the average 
labour income for ages 30-49. Regarding population with primary education, their 
labour income profile is practically flat for ages 30-55 - around 80% of the average 
income at 30-49. Finally, individuals with less than primary education earn the 
maximum at 30-34 – around 50% of average income for ages 30-49. The pattern 
is quite similar in Mexico, although a much higher difference is observed for 
individuals with the higher level of education: their per capita labour income for 
ages 30-65 is over 3 times the average labour income at 30-49. On average, 
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labour income of individuals from age 30 to 59 with post-secondary education in 
Mexico is 8.6 times that of the individuals with less than primary studies, while 
that ratio is 5.1 in Spain. 
 
Figure 3: Economic profiles (Labour income – YL and Consumption – C) per capita by individual 
level of education in Mexico (2004) 
 
Second, regarding consumption profiles, the differences by level of education are 
again clearly higher in Mexico. Consumption of highly educated individuals more 
than doubles average consumption, while consumption of the less educated is half 
that of average consumption. For Spain, consumption profiles by level of education 
are much more similar, and consumption of highly educated individuals is 60% 
higher than consumption of less educated individuals among ages 30 to 59. It is 
worth noting that the average consumption profile observed in Spain among the 
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middle age groups (30 to 49) is 66% of the average labour income for ages 30-
49, significantly lower than in Mexico, where it is around 90%. 
 
Figure 4: Economic profiles (Labour income – YL and Consumption – C) per capita by individual 
level of education in Spain (2006) 
 
The per capita lifecycle deficit (LCD) profiles for both countries are shown in Figure 
5. In general, Mexico presents higher deficits than Spain because, as seen in 
previous Figures, its consumption profiles are clearly higher than in Spain at every 
level of education, while labour income profiles are not. Interestingly, it can be 
observed that in Mexico only individuals with at least secondary education can 
generate a surplus (labour income over consumption) during their lifecycle. This 
surplus is much more significant in the case of individuals with higher education, 
while very modest for individuals with secondary studies. On the contrary, people 
with less than secondary education present a continuous deficit (they consume 
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more than they produce) over their whole lifecycle. In Spain, the picture is slightly 
better: individuals with primary or higher education experience a surplus during 
part of their working-age years, being clearly longer and bigger than in Mexico.  
 
Figure 5: The lifecycle deficit (LCD) profiles by level of education 
4 The role of education in the demographic dividend 
4.1 Baseline results 
Figure 6 shows the results of the demographic dividend (defined as the rate of 
growth of the support ratio) for the period 1970 to 2100 in Mexico and Spain, 
distinguishing the education and age effects. As explained above, the education 
effect captures the impact on the demographic dividend of changes in the 
population composition by education level, while the age effect estimates the 
impact of changes in the age structure. If we just look at the evolution of the total 
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SR growth (black line) we observe that, for Mexico, it reached the highest growth 
rate in 1985 and from then it initiates a progressive decrease until it becomes 
negative in 2040, remaining negative for the rest of the century. In the case of 
Spain, the evolution is somewhat different. The support ratio peaks a decade later 
– in 1995-99 – but decreases faster, becoming negative by 2030-34. Negative 
values are clearly higher in Spain than in Mexico, but they last until 2055, when 
the growth of the support ratio becomes positive again for a short period of 20 
years.  
Regarding the age effect, both in Mexico and Spain, the estimated positive effect 
will last until 2020 and will remain negative for the whole century. In Spain, the 
negative age effect will peak in 2040 (coinciding with the full retirement of the 
baby boom generation) and will improve from then on. In the case of Mexico, the 
negative effect of age increases continuously along the period, but it is never as 
important as in Spain, due to the different time path of their demographic 
transitions. 
While the age effect closely follows the evolution of the total dependency ratio, 
the education effect is positive as the education level of the population continues 
to increase, this occurs throughout the period for both Mexico and Spain. Hence, 
the growth of the support ratio will remain positive if the positive education effect 
is higher than the negative age effect.  
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Figure 6: Decomposition of the demographic dividend by age and education in Mexico and Spain, 
1970-2100 
 
It is worth noting that, although the Spanish population is expected to reach higher 
education levels than Mexican population, it also exhibits a much more negative 
age effect, which holds back the positive effect of education. Therefore, it is true 
that education expansion can partly overcome the negative impact of an 
increasing dependency ratio on the demographic dividend, but the population age 
structure continues to be crucial in the evolution of the SR. 
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 Period GDP per 
capita 
GDP per 
consumer 
SR Education 
effect 
Age 
effect 
MEXICO 1970-75 6.54 4.45 1.35 1.23 0.13 
1975-80 5.15 3.52 2.03 1.56 0.49 
1980-85 1.94 0.39 2.56 1.60 1.02 
1985-90 2.15 0.43 2.53 1.61 0.97 
1990-95 1.66 -0.01 2.50 1.35 1.21 
1995-2000 5.05 3.73 2.18 1.19 1.03 
2000-05 1.42 1.50 1.77 0.97 0.83 
2005-10 2.86 2.37 1.26 0.85 0.42 
2010-15 2.77 1.05 0.91 0.72 0.20 
1970-2015 3.27 1.92 1.90 1.23 0.70 
SPAIN 1970-75 4.46 4.65 0.70 0.93 -0.24 
1975-80 1.52 1.60 0.72 0.82 -0.10 
1980-85 1.07 1.21 2.32 1.82 0.53 
1985-90 3.90 4.04 1.27 1.10 0.18 
1990-95 1.51 1.37 2.67 2.02 0.70 
  The impact of education on the demographic dividend 
 
                                                                  
23 
1995-2000 3.41 3.44 1.83 1.09 0.77 
2000-05 2.81 2.71 1.69 1.01 0.70 
2005-10 1.06 0.86 1.10 0.70 0.41 
2010-15 -0.54 -0.81 0.64 0.64 0.00 
1970-2015 2.12 2.10 1.47 1.15 0.34 
Table 1: The GDP growth and the demographic dividend decomposed by age and education (1970-
2015) (Percentage average annual growth rates) 
Source: Authors’ calculations. GDP data from OECD statistics. 
 
As mentioned above, the demographic dividend measures the effects of changes 
in age structure (age effect) and educational attainment (educational effect) on 
economic growth. In order to explore this relationship, Table 1 shows past trends 
of the demographic dividend decomposed for the two factors (age and education), 
together with the annual GDP growth observed, both in per capita and per effective 
consumer terms.6 Mexico has registered an average annual growth of the support 
ratio of 1.90% over the period 1970-2015, due to a positive age structure and 
especially to a very favourable education effect. However, although annual GDP 
per capita growth was 3.27%, GDP per effective consumer only grew by 1.92%, 
due to the unfavourable relations between labour income and consumption. Of 
upmost importance, during the most favourable period in terms of SR growth 
(1980-95) the GDP growth rate was well below its previous levels. This result 
indicates that Mexico was not taking full advantage of its favourable demographic 
and educational development. 
                                       
6 The GDP per effective consumer weights population by the estimated consumption profile 
in the corresponding country. We use the consumption profile estimated in Section 4, 
updated to the corresponding year. 
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In Spain, the demographic dividend was also positive (1.47%) throughout the 
period 1970-2015, although the age effect is zero in the last years. This accounted 
for 70% of GDP per effective consumer growth. However, during some periods 
(1980-85; 1990-95 and 2005-15), the Spanish economy clearly grew below the 
demographic dividend, meaning that the opportunities offered by the population 
structure in terms of age and education level were also neglected. Hence, it seems 
that in the past Spain, and especially Mexico, were not able to fully benefit from 
having a significant demographic dividend. This is particularly worrying provided 
that the demographic dividend will be much lower, and even negative, in the 
future. 
In order to evaluate the robustness of our results, we perform two sensitivity 
exercises. First, we evaluate the impact of the education projections by using two 
alternative scenarios to our central hypothesis, as described in the third section. 
Second, we try to evaluate the impact of the economic profiles of consumption 
and labour income employed, by exchanging the profiles estimated for both 
countries. 
4.2 Sensitivity analysis (I): Changing education projection 
scenarios 
As a sensitivity test, we re-estimate our results of the demographic dividend 
decomposed with two alternative scenarios of population distribution by level of 
education, also available in Lutz et al. (2014), as described in the third section. 
As mentioned, the CER scenario considers very little improvements in the 
educational attainment of both countries, while the FT scenario assumes a faster 
education expansion than in the central projection. Both alternative scenarios use 
the same assumptions as the baseline scenario, except for the education 
enrolment rates. However, as demographic components depend on the education 
level of the population, different population age structures result in each of these 
alternative scenarios. 
Results obtained with the two alternative education scenarios, together with our 
baseline estimation, are shown in Figures 7 (Mexico) and 8 (Spain). As expected, 
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in the CER scenario the education effect is clearly lower for both countries, 
becoming zero around 2040 in both cases, and remaining close to zero from then 
onwards. The decline of the education effect means that the demographic dividend 
becomes dependent mostly on the age effect, and turns negative earlier and much 
stronger than in the baseline scenario. Results using FT projections are the 
opposite. In this case, the education effect is much more positive during the first 
half of the projection. After 2060 in Mexico and 2070 in Spain, the education effect 
is lower than in the baseline scenario, probably because the population will have 
almost exhausted the capacity to improve its education level. Once a majority of 
the population is already enrolled in school until tertiary education, improvements 
are necessarily smaller. Therefore, the consequences are very positive in the 
medium term, but puzzling further into the future. In the case of Mexico, under 
the faster education expansion the demographic dividend remains positive until 
later, but then the age effect decreases sharply, driving the SR to very negative 
values in 2060. In Spain, the negative SR from 2020-2050 almost disappears, 
overcoming the baby-boom generation aging. 
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Figure 7: The demographic dividend in Mexico with alternative education projection scenarios 
 
Overall, the results of both scenarios make it clear that improvements in education 
attainment of the population are crucial in the evolution of the demographic 
dividend, both by their direct impact and also by their effect on the demographic 
components influencing the age effect. 
 
 
Figure 8: The demographic dividend in Spain with alternative education projection scenarios 
 
4.3 Sensitivity analysis (II): The effect of the economic profile 
As explained in the fourth section, estimated economic profiles of labour income 
and consumption (and hence of LCD) are significantly different by level of 
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education within each country, but there are also disparities between countries. 
Spain presents more favourable profiles in terms of LCD, as its relative 
consumption profiles are clearly lower than in Mexico for all education levels, while 
its relative labour income profiles are slightly higher. In order to evaluate the 
impact of the economic profiles on the demographic dividend, a simulation 
exercise is created by exchanging the estimated profiles for both countries. 
Therefore, we estimate the evolution of the demographic dividend in Mexico if it 
had the economic profiles of Spain, and vice versa, the demographic dividend in 
Spain with the labour income and consumption profiles of Mexico (Figure 9).  
 
Figure 9: The demographic dividend in Mexico and Spain using economic profiles from the other 
country 
 
The results show that both age and education effects are affected by economic 
profiles. In Mexico, more favourable economic profiles would imply a considerably 
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higher demographic dividend, which would not become negative in the period 
considered. This means that, ceteris paribus, a lower per capita lifecycle deficit 
profile in Mexico would be sufficient to overcome the negative effects of aging in 
its economy. As for Spain, the opposite is observed: worse lifecycle deficit profiles 
–with higher deficits and lower surpluses– than those observed in Mexico would 
lead to a scenario where the demographic dividend would become negative earlier 
and would remain below zero for longer. Hence, the same conclusion is confirmed 
in both cases: lower(higher) lifecycle deficit profiles would improve (worsen) the 
demographic dividend evolution, as a combination of effects in both age and 
education components. 
5 Conclusions 
The potential positive effects of a favourable population age structure on economic 
growth have been investigated in recent decades through the estimation of the 
demographic dividend. This research was mainly motivated by the demographic 
transition that most countries are facing as they develop. The first estimations of 
the demographic dividend looked into the relations between the working-age 
population and the economically dependent individuals, namely the support ratio. 
In a first stage of the demographic transition the working-age population grows 
faster than the overall population, having a positive effect on economic growth. 
The opposite occurs in a second stage, when the aging process arrives and the 
support ratio growth becomes negative. However, it turned out that the first 
stages of demographic transition coincided in time with a significant education 
expansion in most countries, which also interacts with this process. This means 
that economic growth is not only influenced by age structure changes, but also by 
the improvements in the education attainment of the population. In this paper we 
propose to disentangle both effects through the decomposition of the demographic 
dividend. 
The estimation of the decomposition requires population data by age and 
education for the past and projections for the future, as well as estimations of per 
capita profiles of labour income and consumption, also by age and level of 
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education. The former was obtained from a recently available dataset (Lutz et al., 
2014; Speringer et al. 2015). Regarding the economic profiles, the NTA project 
provides them for a wide range of countries, but no data are yet available by 
education level. Hence, we focus our estimation on two specific countries, Mexico 
and Spain, estimating their economic profiles by age and level of education.  
Our results reveal interesting insights. First, the positive age effect in Mexico starts 
before 1970, peaks in around 2000 and finishes in around 2020, when it will 
become negative. In the case of Spain, the age effect starts later (in 1980) but 
ends by 2020, as well. Second, the education effect is clearly higher than the age 
effect in the past in both countries, and remains positive throughout the period 
observed. When adding the education component to the demographic dividend, 
the future negative effect of aging on the support ratio is partly offset. This implies 
that education is an important mechanism to reduce the adverse effects of aging, 
as education expansion delays the starting point of the negative growth of the 
SR). Nevertheless, it is important to take into account that a higher education also 
implies a faster aging in the future, turning the age effect more negative, as the 
sensitivity scenarios showed. Third, we showed that economic profiles by age and 
level of education could also have important effects on the demographic dividend: 
ceteris paribus, the lower (higher) the lifecycle deficits the better (worse) the 
support ratio growth. Quite interestingly the sensitivity scenarios show that, if 
Mexico had consumption and labour income age profiles similar to those for Spain, 
it could completely avoid negative growth of the support ratio. The reason is that 
the education improvement would be sufficient to offset a milder aging process.  
These findings also offer guidance on how to approach the demographic transition 
from a policy point of view. The demographic dividend could be expanded through 
policy mechanisms that focus not only on reducing population aging but also on 
expanding education attainment and improving the lifecycle deficit surplus. This 
gives governments more options to overcome the potential negative impact of 
aging. In the case of developing countries, in the first stage of the demographic 
transition education policy seems to be the best way to take advantage of, or even 
extend, the period during the demographic dividend.   
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In any case, further research is needed in order to investigate the interaction 
between economic and demographic evolution, from both the theoretical and the 
empirical perspective. On the one hand, there is a clear need to obtain time series 
estimates of the age profiles in order to refine the analysis undertaken. On the 
other hand, from a more general perspective, the interactions between 
demographic and economic variables are diverse and still quite unknown, being 
as crucial as the links between fertility, mortality, education and economic 
wellbeing.   
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